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Abstract: An Equilibrium Model of User Generated Content
This paper considers the joint creation and consumption of content on user generated
content platforms (e.g., reviews or articles, chat, videos, etc.). On these platforms, users’
utilities depend upon the participation of others; hence, users’ expectations regarding the
participation of others on the site becomes germane to their own involvement levels. Yet
these beliefs are often assumed to be fixed. Accordingly, we develop a dynamic rational
expectations equilibrium model of joint consumption and generation of information. We
estimate the model on a novel data set from a large Internet forum site and use the model
to offer recommendations regarding site strategy. Results indicate that beliefs play a major
role in UGC, ignoring these beliefs leads to erroneous inferences about consumer behavior,
and that these beliefs have an important implications for the marketing strategy of UGC
sites.
We find that user and site generated content can be either strategic complements or
substitutes depending on whether the competition for existing readers exceeds the potential
to attract new ones. In our data, the competitive effect substantially dilutes the market
expansion effect of site generated content. Likewise, past and current content can also be
either strategic substitutes or complements. Results indicate more durable content increases
overall site participation, suggesting that the site should invest in making past information
easier to find (via better search or page design). Third, because content consumption and
generation interact, it is unclear which factor dominates in network growth. We find that
decreasing content consumption costs (perhaps by changing site design or via search tools)
enhances site engagement more than decreasing content generating costs. Overall, enhancing
content durability and reducing content consumption cost appear to be the most effective
strategies for increasing site visitation.
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1 Introduction
By dramatically lowering the cost of content dissemination and consumption, online commu-
nication platforms have engendered a rapid proliferation in global user engagement. Evidence
is afforded by a recent ranking done by Google’s Ad Planner, listing several user sites with
substantial user generated content among the top 20 most trafficked web sites (Youtube.com,
Wikipedia.com, Mozilla.com, Wordpress.com, Ask.com, Amazon.com and Taobao.com).1
Coincident with this increase, advertisers are spending more of their budget on social media
and user generated content sites (UGC), exceeding $2BB annually, or more than 8% of firms
online advertising expenditures (eMarketer 2010).
UGC platforms rely upon two behaviors; consuming content (e.g., listening or reading)
and generating content (e.g., discussing or writing). Content consumption generates utility
via the pleasure of reading or the utility of information. Content generation, like posting
a review, yields utility from the reputational effect of being influential, knowledgeable or
popular, suggesting utility increases as more of their content is consumed (Bughin (2007);
Hennig-Thurau et al. (2004); Nardi et al. (2004); Nov (2007)).2 Hence, the utility of content
increases as the number of persons consuming the content (for example, reading a review)
increases. Accordingly, the content generation decision is predicated on beliefs about the
number of other people consuming and generating content. As such, users’ beliefs about
others participation on the platform are central to the problem content generation and
consumption. In spite of this few, if any papers, explicitly consider the role of these beliefs
on the growth of UGC networks.
We address this gap by capturing the evolution in beliefs about future consumption and
generation of content, that is we allow these beliefs about the site participation of others
to be endogenous. In the process, we develop a dynamic rational expectations equilibrium
model of user generated content and consumption in the context of heterogeneous users. In
this equilibrium, users on a UGC platform reason that the aggregate growth in the network
should be consistent with sum of decisions made by all individuals who are users of it (Lee
1http://www.google.com/adplanner/static/top1000/
2In this paper we use content and posting interchangeably in which case posting implies the posting of
user generated content.
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and Wolpin 2006; Krusell and Smith 1998). This rational expectations equilibrium forms
the basis of a joint dynamic and structural model of consumption and generation of content
wherein reading is posited to increase with content availability and content availability is
posited to increase with readership. Owing to its structural orientation, this approach enables
us to address of number of questions of interest to UGC platforms:
1. Site Generated Content. To increase consumers’ utility of consumption, platforms
can provision more site generated content; for example, a site with user forums could
actively participate via additional content. However, the problem of managing site
generated content is challenging. On the one hand, increased site content attracts
more users because of the increased availability of information. In this instance, site
content is a strategic complement to user content. On the other hand, site generated
content can dissuade users from posting content because site and user content are
substitutes. In this instance, it is a strategic substitute. The optimal site generated
content, therefore, becomes a question of the relative magnitude of these various effects.
In our context, site and user content are strategic complements at low levels of site
content, but become substitutes as the site content crowds the user content. The
optimal 12% increase in site content would increase user traffic by 2.2%.
2. Content Durability. An analogous argument holds for the durability of user content
(e.g., the ease of finding past content or its relevance).The more durable the content,
the greater the potential site content available to readers thereby making the site
more attractive to readers. For example, a searchable archive of past content makes
older content more accessible and increases the likelihood of a reader finding relevant
information. In this sense, current and past content can be strategic complements.
However, the increased availability of past content also competes for reader attention
with content in the current period. As a result, more durable content increases the
competition for readers both from others and one’s own past content. In this sense,
past and current content can also be strategic substitutes. We show both effects obtain,
though doubling the expected lifetime of content (from 1 to 2 weeks) increases user
traffic by 9.1% and user generated content by 22.8%. Overall, this appears to be a
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particularly effective strategy for the site.
3. Content Generation and Consumption Costs. Likewise, sites can lower user participa-
tion costs via site design changes, frequent participation programs or other incentives
to increase engagement. In this instance, a site might be concerned about whether to
weigh content generation or content consumption more heavily in designing a customer
engagement program. How to weight consumption vs. generation is incumbent upon
the indirect network effects of one behavior on the other. Even if the direct effect of
posting content is small, for example, the indirect effect of posting content on read-
ing can be large. We find the arc elasticity of content generation costs to be 1.89 for
content generation and 0.38 for visits while the arc elasticity of content consumption
costs is 0.79 for content generation and 1.13 for visits. Thus, if the cost of improving
the content generation experience is less than two times the cost of consumption, the
firm should emphasize an enhancement of the generation experience.
4. Beliefs About Future Consumption and Content. Owing to the dynamics in beliefs,
early user trials can have a profound effect upon whether the network grows or im-
plodes. Without sufficient reading mass, content generators might believe there is little
value in creating content, thereby leading to a downward “death spiral” for the hosting
platform. Related, the concept of self-fulfilling prophecies are germane in the context
of social engagement, because the beliefs that others will enter the site can induce a
herding behavior towards using the site. A site could create these prophecies, for exam-
ple, by advertising its intention to increase overall participation. We find that changing
user beliefs about future content will have little effect on the site participation in our
data and therefore the equilibria are quite stable. However, this is not universally true
as the theoretical model suggests that expectations are material in the early stages of
the network where beliefs can affect whether the network tips or implodes.
Of note, policy experiments and comparative statics are profoundly affected when beliefs
about the participation of others is not allowed to evolve with changes in the system as is
common in descriptive research. For example, we find the effect of decrease in the costs of
reading content on site visitations is underestimated by 26% when beliefs are not endogenized
5
because the potential for more readers to attract new content is neglected, leading to a
44% underestimation of content relative to the case when beliefs are exogenous.. Hence,
the rational expectations equilibrium approach we use is critical when assessing how user
generated content is affected by firm strategy and changes in the environment.
In sum, by integrating beliefs regarding the effect of others consumption and generation
of content on one’s own content decisions with a rational expectations equilibrium, our key
contribution is to develop a model that enables us to explore the growth of UGC network.
Though our approach is quite general and applies to many content generation and consump-
tion contexts ranging from chat rooms to journal publications to video sharing sites (where
users post and consume content), we estimate this model using a proprietary data from a web
site where users generate and consume content in the form of reviews and forum postings.
In the next section, we elaborate upon how our model of user engagement differs from
prior work on social networking in general, and user generated content in particular. We
then discuss our data and context and use this information to construct our model. Then
we explore some of the theoretical properties of our model, discuss identification, detail
our results and conduct policy simulations regarding the effect of site generated content on
reading and user generated content.
2 Literature Review
Our work is related to the nascent but growing empirical literature in marketing on social
networking and interaction (e.g., Ansari et al. (2011), Stephen and Toubia 2010, Bulte 2007,
Hartmann 2010, Nair et al. 2010, Katona et al. (2011), and Iyengar et al. 2010). Our
work deviates from the social networking literature inasmuch as we consider user sites with
large numbers of agents such that any single agent’s participation is not likely to have a
sizable effect on aggregate content consumption or generation. To exemplify this point,
consider a user who posts a review on a movie site or Amazon or a video on YouTube;
this agent might focus more upon the sizable number of interested viewers consuming their
content than any given viewer who consumed it. In this regard, our work is analogous to
the rational expectations equilibrium literature in labor economics wherein persons do not
believe that their own participation in the labor force affects wages, but rather that the
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aggregate participation of agents like them will. In such instances, it becomes feasible to
model the dynamic social engagement choices of agents in a structural fashion because we do
not need to condition on the behavior of all other individual agents (e.g., Hartmann 2010),
but only the aggregate states such as the total number of posts or reads.
Likewise, our research is related to the burgeoning literature on user generated content
(Albuquerque et al. 2010, Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006, Dellarocas 2006, Duan et al. 2008,
Hofstetter et al. 2010, Ghose and Han 2010, Zhang and Sarvary (2011), and Zhang et al.
2011) that considers the joint behavior of content consumption and generation.3 Our research
extends this work by developing a dynamic structural model of UGC; specifically, our model
allows users beliefs about site engagement to evolve with the state of the network. This is
material because changes in beliefs regarding the number of users contributing, for example,
can affect whether agents visit a site, consume, or write. If interventions change these beliefs,
it stands to reason that the behaviors of the agents will change. It is therefore desirable for
any policy intervention to accommodate potential changes in beliefs. Moreover, given that
user generated content, like advertising, decays in efficacy over time and that those who
post develop expectations about the likelihood their content is read in the future, there is
considerable potential for dynamic behavior to be evidenced in the context of UGC.
As a dynamic structural model, our work is similar to Huang et al. (2011), who consider
the blogging behavior of the employees of an IT firm. An important point of difference
is that we use an “approximate aggregation” rational expectations equilibrium framework
(Lee and Wolpin 2006; Krusell and Smith 1998) to link individual behavior to aggregate
state transitions (such as total posting and reading). In contrast, Huang et al. (2011) model
users’ behaviors independently of how others at the site react. Because of the approximate
aggregation approach, the equilibrium of our model can accommodate a large number of
heterogeneous agents (more than 100,000 forum users in our dataset). The aggregate state
transitions across all the users can vary with changes in the primitives of the system, yielding
a structural interpretation of the social engagement problem. To our knowledge, ours is the
3Ghose and Han (2011) consider a dynamic structural model of mobile phone content usage based on
consumer learning; they do not jointly model the dynamics in consumption and content generation. Our
work is also complementary to theirs inasmuch as the dynamics in our model reflect expectations about
future readership for posts rather than uncertainty in the usage experience.
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first application of approximate aggregation models to marketing, and this approach can
generalize to other marketing contexts involving large numbers of heterogeneous agents who
condition on the aggregation of others behaviors rather than the behavior of any other
particular agent.
In sum, our contribution is to develop a dynamic structural model of content generation
and consumption for a large number of users and use this model to evaluate indirectly
network effect in a dynamic setting and draw implications regarding how the site who hosts
these interactions should manage their content.
3 Model
3.1 Model Overview
Figure 1 outlines the modeling context. Users consume content generated by others owing to
their interest in information. An increase in content can lead to an increase in use because
users are more likely to find information of interest (Stigler (1961)). Hence, we consider a
model of information search for content of heterogeneous quality. We discuss and model this
indirect network effect in Section 3.2.
Figure 1: Model Overview
An increase in content consumption can lead to an increase in content because those who
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post content presumably do so because they are motivated to have their posts read (Bughin
(2007); Hennig-Thurau et al. (2004); Nardi et al. (2004); Nov (2007)) and we model this
process in Section 3.3. There is also a potential direct network effect of content on content;
as more content appears competition for readers increases; this problem is also considered
in Section 3.3.
Last, it is theoretically possible for an increase in users to lead to more use via word
of mouth (a direct effect of consumption on consumption). Our application considers a
relatively short time horizon. As such, we assume these word of mouth effects to be negligible.
Moreover, users are geographically dispersed and typically know each other only by their user
ids. Therefore they primarily contact other users on the site via an intermediating effect of
posts, but this interaction occurs only through the content they generate and is thus is an
indirect network effect, not a direct effect. Moreover, given the supply of content is limitless,
we expect no competitive effect between readers for content, thereby mitigating another
source of potential direct network effects for consumption.
Both the decisions to generate and consume content are incumbent upon the decision to
visit the site on a given day. To the extent the posting or reading utility exceeds that of
outside options, users visit the site. We discuss this process in Section 3.4.
In sum, we consider M users’ decisions (i = 1, . . . ,M) to visit a content sharing website
on occasion t (t = 1, . . . , T ) and conditioned on that visitation decision, nit ∈ {0, 1}, how
much content to consume, rit, and how much content to generate, ait. Users choose each of
these three actions {nit,rit,ait}to maximize their utility conditioned on their beliefs regarding
overall participation of others in the network.
3.2 Reading
3.2.1 Reading Utility
We presume that individuals read user generated content so long as its marginal benefit
exceeds its marginal cost c (ri). This tradeoff between the cost of reading and gaining utility
from information of interest determines the optimal number of posts that users read. As
the number of posts increases, the likelihood that a user search results in items of interest
increases, thereby leading to an increase in posts read. Following Stigler (1961)’s model of
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information search under a uniform distribution of quality of Kt posts over the range from
L (lower bound on post quality) to U (upper bound on post quality), Appendix A derives
reader i’s utility for reading r posts as
u (ri) = α1rit − α2r
2
it
2Kt
, (1)
where α1 indicates the upper limit, U , on perceived content quality and α2 ≡ U −L indicate
the range of content quality, Kt is the content stock defined in Section 3.2.2 below. Equation
1 implies that the utility of reading evidences decreasing marginal returns in the amount
of UGC and that an increase in UGC increases both the utility and the marginal utility of
reading. This result follows intuitively from a greater likelihood of finding content of interest.
3.2.2 Posting Stock
The utility of reading in equation (1) is incumbent upon the stock of posts generated by
users. Following the advertising literature, we assume that posted information follows a
geometric decay over time (Clarke (1976), Dubé et al. (2005)). This geometric decay can be
justified via probabilistic awareness. A fresh posting in period t will usually be near the top
of a forum, so the probability it will be noticed by a reader is close to one. Postings from the
preceding period have a lower probability of being noticed (ρ < 1) as they age. Following
this logic, posts in period t − k have a ρk chance of being noticed. Thus, at any given site
visit, individual i will only notice A˜t−k of the At−k =
∑M
i=1 ait−k postings in period t − k
where A˜t−k follows a binomial distribution A˜t−k ∼ Bin
(
At−k, ρk
)
. Summing the noticed
posts across periods leads to an aggregate stock formulation of form:
Kt = E
(
t∑
τ=1
A˜τ
)
=
t∑
τ=1
ρt−τAτ = ρKt−1 + At
where ρ < 1 is the discount rate and Aτ is the number of postings in period t. Likewise, the
individual-level stock of postings is given by
kit =
τ∑
t=1
ρτ−taiτ = ρki,t−1 + ait. (2)
The geometric decay argument can analogously be extended to site generated content leading
to the total stock of information being given by:
Kt = KUt +KSt , (3)
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where KUt denotes user generated content and KSt is an analogously constructed variable
that captures the stock of site generated content.
3.2.3 Reading Costs
Next we consider the cost of reading. Following Yao and Mela (2008) and others, we assume
the cost has a quadratic form that reflects an increasing scarcity of time or attention as more
items are read,
c (rit) = κ1rit + κ2
r2it
2 , (4)
where κ1 and κ2 are positive implying increasing marginal cost and κ2 > 0 means an in-
creasing marginal cost of reading. Hence, the total payoff of reading is
u (rit)− c (rit) = (α1 − κ1) rit −
[
α2
Kt
+ κ2
]
r2it
2 . (5)
Given this utility, the optimal reading r∗it is solved by the first order condition
d
drit
[u (rit)− c (rit)] |ri=r∗i = (α1 − κ1)−
[
α2
Kt
+ κ2
]
r∗it = 0⇒
r∗it =
α1 − κ1
α2/Kt + κ2
(6)
3.2.4 Heterogeneity and Seasonality Effects
We model reading heterogeneity in the cost function as follows: a random effect for unob-
served time-invariant heterogeneity ζi and an individual and per-period random shock νit,
which allows for unobserved situational error.
We accommodate seasonality by allowing κ1 in (4) to vary overtime and re-define it as
κ1it. This variation allows for seasonal effects such as work week effects where broadband
access is often higher.
The seasonal effect κ1it is also indexed by i because it can be heterogeneous across user.
The coefficient of quadratic term in the reading cost function κ2 can also be heterogeneous,
so we let it be κ2i.4
Accordingly, the payoff of reading in equation (5) can be rewritten as
u (rit)− c (rit) = νit (α1 − κ1it − ζi) rit −
[
α2
Kt
+ κ2i
]
r2it
2 , (7)
4Equation (6) indicates that only α1 − κ1 determines r∗ in the numerator. Hence, a constraint has to be
imposed on κ1it to identify α1 in the empirical analysis.
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where νit is the random shock in the amount of reading across time and is assumed iid across
individuals and time periods. As users typically read in large quantities, we treat rit as
a continuous variable and hence assume νit to be continuous. 5 We further assume νit is
independent of ζi, κ1it and κ2i and all of them are known to the users but not the researcher.6
Because νit is realized after a user’s decision on whether she visits the forum, we can further
assume vit independent of the site visitation decision and E (νit|nit) = 1.7 .
To model the heterogeneity in ζi, κ1it and κ2i, we use a finite mixture model by letting
them follow a discrete distribution which can be interpreted as a finite number of latent
segments of readers
[ζi, κ1it, κ2i] ∼
J∑
j=1
pjI
(
ζi = ζ¯j
)
I (κ1it = κ¯1jt) I (κ2i = κ¯2j) ,
where there are J latent classes and user i belongs to class j with probability pj.We constrain
ζ¯j such that
∑J
j=1 ζ¯j = 0 because α1 already subsumes a non-zero mean for readings.
With these errors, the optimal reading level in 6 can now be expressed as
r∗it =
α1 − κ1it − ζi
α2/Kt + κ2i
νit. (8)
Given that νit is realized after the user’s site visitation decision, the user’s decision to visit
the forum at time t depends only on the expected optimal amount of reading defined by
Ei (r∗it|Kt, ζi) =
α1 − κ1it − ζi
α2/Kt + κ2i
E (νit) =
α1 − κ1it − ζi
α2/Kt + κ2i
, (9)
and the expected optimal number of postings, which will be discussed in Section 3.3.
5It is not imperative to impose any parametric distribution on νit though we assume νit to be exponential
in Appendix E.1 to facilitate maximum likelihood estimation.
6The νit’s are also not correlated with Kt, though Kt is an endogenously generated variable. This is
because if we have a large number M of users, then 1/M
∑M
i=1 νit ≈ E [νit] = 1 by the law of large numbers.
We will see in the following subsections that users only use the aggregate readings Rt =
∑M
i=1 rit in their
posting decision problem. When M is large, Rt =
∑M
i=1 r
∗
itνit →Mr∗it, so the effect of vit’s will cancel out.
7Users first decide whether they will visit the forum website at t before they make decision on the amount
of reading and the number of postings. The random shock in reading and posting payoffs are both assumed
to be realized after the visiting decision is made. Section 3.4 details how the site visitation decision is made
based on expected maximal posting and reading payoffs.
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3.3 User Generated Content
3.3.1 The Per-Period Utility of UGC
Site users derive utility from others reading their posts and this expected posting utility is
incumbent upon the users beliefs their postings will be read. The expected average amount
of reading per posting is used to model the reading likelihood because a user on our forum
cannot observe the exact amount of reading for each of her postings (there is not a counter
of “number of views” on the forum we model unlike, e.g., Youtube). This expected amount
of reading per posting (yt) is defined by
yt =
Rt
Kt
=
∑M
i=1E(nitr∗it|Kt, ζi)
Kt
. (10)
Equation (10) demonstrates two competing effects aggregate UGC Kt on yt. First, there is
a primary demand effect of Kt in the numerator as the expected optimal amount of reading
increases with the supply of content, Kt based on equation (9). Second, there is a competitive
effect of Kt in the denominator as more postings will reduce the amount of reading per
posting. Therefore, the net effect Kt on yt can be positive or negative. In Appendix B, we
show that the user’s expected amount of reading per posting yt can be closely approximated
by the exactly observed amount of reading per posting under the assumption of rational
expectations, when the number of users and the UGC stock Kt are both very large. Hence,
in the subsequent model development, we do not distinguish between expected and observed
reading rates.
Given the imputed likelihood their posts are read, the current period expected utility
from generating content in period t can be written as a function of the number of the posts
a user i writes and the rates with which these posts are read,
u(ait|sit) = g(ki,tyt) = g ([ρki,t−1 + ait] yt) , (11)
where g (x) is a utility function with diminishing marginal return. A common choice of g (x)
is
g (x) = x
1−γ
1− γ , γ ∈ [0,∞) (12)
where we have g (x) = x when γ = 0 and g (x) = log (x) when γ = 1.
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In equation (11), sit is defined as a set of state variables which we enumerate next. First,
kit is the posting stock of user i at period t, so kit ∈ sit. Second, the expected amount
of reading per posting yt defined by equation (10) is merely a function of the aggregate
posting stock Kt and hence Kt ∈ sit. Other state variables in the UGC posting problem
will appear in the posting cost function, which will be defined in the following subsection.
The actions variable ait represents the number of postings user i choose at period t given her
state variables kit and Kt. This posting decision ait is comprised of a discrete set of integer
number of posting, i.e., ait ∈ A = {0, 1, 2, . . . , a¯}, where a¯ is a large integer representing the
upper bound of postings a user can write in period t.
3.3.2 The Cost of UGC Posting
Similar to the cost of reading, the cost of writing is specified as
cit(ait|sit, εit) = (τit + ξi)ait − εit(ait), (13)
where, the random errors in the cost function, εit(ait), has a generalized extreme value (GEV)
distribution, which will be specified below with the site-visitation model (Section 3.4) to form
a nest-logit type of choice probabilities. The time-invariant component of the linear marginal
cost ξi is heterogeneous across users and is assumed to follow a discrete distribution for a
latent segment model. τit models seasonal effect such as a weekend effect. We also assume
the seasonal effect τit to be idiosyncratic to different latent segments. Together with the
heterogeneity in the reading cost function, we propose the following joint discrete distribution
for the latent segment model:
[ξi, τit, ζi, κ2i] ∼
J∑
j=1
pjI
(
i = ξ¯j
)
I (τit = τ¯jt) I
(
ζi = ζ¯j
)
I (κ2i = κ¯2j) , (14)
where there are J latent segments and user i belongs to segment j with probability pj. In the
formula above, ξ¯j is the segment-specific value of the time-invariant effect in the marginal
cost of posting if user i belongs to segment j and τ¯jt is segment-specific seasonal effect.
Finally, we define the non-random part of cost cit (ait|sit) to be
c¯it (ait|sit) = (τit + ξi)ait.
Because the τit and varies over time, it also enters the set of state variable sit, i.e., τit ∈ sit.
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3.3.3 Optimal UGC Posting Levels
Given the decay in stock, a forum user’s posting decision becomes dynamic optimization
problem. A user chooses the number of posts (amount of content to generate) ait that
maximizes the discounted expected sum of period utilities minus period costs to obtain the
following value function
Vi (ait|sit, εit) = max
ait,ai,t+1,...
E
( ∞∑
τ=t
u(ait|sit)− cit(ait|sit, εit)
)
. (15)
In this dynamic optimization problem, sit = {kit, Kt, τit} and εit are the state variables and
the number of per-period postings ait is the control variable.
The value function of this optimization problem in the form of Bellman’s equation is
Vi(sit, εit) = max
ait∈A
{u(ait|sit)− c¯it(ait|sit) + εit(ait) + βE[Vi(si,t+1, εi,t+1)|sit, ait]}, (16)
where A ≡ {0, 1, . . . , a¯} is the action space.8
3.4 Site Visitation
Prior to posting, a user must first decide whether to visit the UGC website and this decision
is predicated upon the expected utility from consuming and generating content should the
user decide to visit. Hence, the utility from visiting the site on a given occasion includes
utilities from writing and expected reading is given as
u(nit = 1|sit) = µ1Emax
rit
[u(rit)− cit(rit)] +
max
ait
[u(ait|sit)− cit(ait|sit, εit) + βE˜V j(sit, ait)] + ηεit(nit = 1) (17)
where µ1 is a scale parameter such that the utility of reading can be rescaled to the utility
measure of posting.9 The indicator variable nit ∈ {0, 1} indexes the site visitation decision.
8The inter-temporal substitution of posting for the dynamic optimization problem is as follows. If we treat
ait as a continuous variable, we can derive the Euler equation −
[
(yt (ρki,t−1 + ait))−γ − (τit + ξi)
]
/(τi,t+1+
ξi) = βρ, which shows posting one more unit of UGC will gain utility [yt (ρki,t−1 + ait)]−γ and incur cost
(τt + ξi) in the current period t. This additional posting will also gain utility discounted by βρ in the next
period t + 1. However, if a user selects to post in t + 1 instead of t, she will forgo the utility in t, which
is [yt (ρki,t−1 + ait)]−γ , and avoid cost (τit + ξi). The cost incurred in t + 1 is (τi,t+1 + ξi) instead. The
optimal number of postings is achieved when the user is indifferent about whether posting an additional
unit in t or t + 1. Thus, increasing durability of UGC, ρ, tends to increase the incentive to post in the
current period. However, the competitive effect from the increased postings of other users and one’s own
past postings constitutes indirect disincentive to post.
9Regarding the expected utility of reading, note that Equation (8) assumes that users who visit a site
will always read at least some posts, because r∗it > 0 is always an interior optimal solution. This implies the
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The contextual shock εit (nit = 1), which represent the exogenous cost for a user to visit the
site at period t and is known to the user but not the econometrician.
The corresponding utility from not using the site contains three components. First, users
continue to obtain utility from those who read their posts from past visits. The decayed
posts are given by kit = ρki,t−1, which the attendant reading rate yt in period t. Hence,
the flow utility of other users reading posts when the site is not visited is given by g(kityt).
Second, µ0i is a segment-specific intercept which measures opportunity utility gained outside
if the time spent on the forum is used elsewhere. Third, there is again the contextual shock
εit (nit = 0). Therefore, the utility of not visiting the site is given by
u(nit = 0|sit) = µ0i + g(kityt) + βE˜V i(sit, nit = 0) + ηεit(nit = 0), (18)
where E˜V i(sit, nit = 0) will be defined when we derive the user’s site visitation and posting
probabilities in the following subsection. A user chooses to visit the forum website if u(nit =
1|sit) > u(nit = 0|sit) and vice versa.
3.5 Choice Probabilities for Content Generation and Site Visita-
tion
To derive the choice probabilities for posting and site visitation, we assume εit (ait), εit (nit = 0)
and εit (nit = 1) have iid Type-1 Extreme Value (Gumbel) distributions.10
We further define E˜V i(sit, ait) to be the integrated value function,
E˜V i(sit, ait) =
ˆ
si,t+1
ˆ
εi,t+1
Vi(si,t+1, εi,t+1)p(si,t+1, εi,t+1|sit, εit, ait)dsi,t+1dεi,t+1, (19)
which is the fixed point of the following functional equation (Rust, 1987 and 1994) under
the conditional independence assumption for εit and sit
E˜V i(s, a) =
ˆ
s′
log
∑
a′∈A
exp
{
u(a′|s′)− c¯it(a′|s′) + βE˜V i (s′, a′)
} · p(s′|s, a)ds′. (20)
expected utility of reading is always greater than zero if a user decide to visit. This specification is consistent
with the data as 99.998% of the users read postings upon entering the site.
10An alternative model for the random errors assuming McFadden’s Generalized Extreme Value (GEV)
distribution for εit (ait) and εit (nit = 0) and εit (nit = 1) = 0 yields a nested logit model with the equivalent
inclusive value function and choice probabilities subject to reparameterization. See Choi and Moon (1997)
for the details of the inclusive value function for the GEV model.
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Using Equation 19, the optimal posting decision is to choose ait if and only if
u(ait|sit)− c¯it(ait|sit) + εit(ait) + βE˜V i(sit, ait) ≥
u(a′it|sit)− c¯it(a′it|sit) + εit(a′it) + βE˜V i(sit, a′it),∀a′it 6= ait ∈ A, (21)
by which we derive the probability of writing ait forum postings conditional on site visitation
as
P (ait|sit, nit = 1) = exp(u(ait|sit)− c¯it(ait|sit) + βE˜V i(sit, ait))∑
a′it∈A exp(u(a
′
it|sit)− c¯it(a′it|sit) + βE˜V i(sit, a′it))
. (22)
Because not visiting the forum site leads to zero postings and the same decay of posting
stock as writing no posting when the user visits the site, we have
E˜V i(sit, nit = 0) = E˜V i(sit, nit = 1, ait = 0). (23)
We define the inclusive value of writing forum postings conditional on site visitation as
IVit = ln
∑
ait∈A
exp(u(ait|sit)− c¯it(ait|sit) + βE˜V i(sit, ait)). (24)
Based on equations (23) and (24), we derive the choice probability of visiting the site as
P (nit = 1|sit) = (25)
exp {µ1Emaxrit [u(rit)− cit(rit)] + ηIVit}
exp
{
µ0j + η
[
g(kityt) + βE˜V j(sit, nit = 0
]
)
}
+ exp {µ1Emaxrit [u(rit)− cit(rit)] + ηIVit}
and P (nit = 1|sit) = 1− P (nit = 1|sit).
Note that when we apply the latent segment model in equation (14), the integrated value
function E˜V i(s, a) is the same for all the users in segment j (j = 1, . . . , J). Hence, we let
E˜V i(s, a) = E˜V j(s, a) if user i is in segment j.
3.6 State Transitions
In this section, we detail the state transition, p(s′|s), indicated in equation 19. First, The
individual stock kit evolves deterministically kit = ρki,t−1 + ait. Second, the aggregate stock
of site content, Kt, consists of two parts: the stock of site-generated content, KSt and the
aggregate user-generated content KUt =
∑M
i=1 kit. Site content, KSt , is exogenous and evolves
stochastically over time. The aggregate UGC, KUt , evolves deterministically given KUt−1 and
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ait; i = 1, . . . ,M . However, from the perspective of any individual user i, KUt given KUt−1 is
stochastic because she does not observe ait and εit of other users. When the site has a very
large number of users, we can assume any user i believes her own action ait has no influence
on the aggregate UGC, KUt . This claim is similar to the assumption of pure competition
where no agents in the market assume their individual output can change the total supply.
Hence, user i assumed that KUt evolves given KUt−1 and KSt , but independent of her own
action ait. If we impose a rational expectations constraint, then user i’s belief about the
state transition for KUt must coincide with the actual behavior by users on the site. This
will be discussed in detail next in Section 3.7 below. Finally, the random shocks, εit, are
assumed to be i.i.d. over time and across individuals and independent of sit.
3.7 Rational Expectations Equilibrium and Approximate Aggre-
gation
Aggregate content, Kt = KUt + KSt , is the sum of individual users’ actions plus the exoge-
nous site generated content.Rational expectations require that the beliefs about the Kt be
consistent with its actual transitions, which reflect the sum of all individuals’ posting behav-
iors. This observation becomes critically important in policy simulations because there is no
reason to presume the evolution of Kt is invariant to a change in policy that might affect
users’ participation levels.
Using an approximate aggregation approach to rational expectations equilibrium pio-
neered by Krusell and Smith (1998), we first formulate agent’s beliefs on how the aggregate
state variable Kt evolve over time as follows
KSt = ωS0 + ωS1KSt−1 + νSt , (26)
Kt = ωU0t + ωU1 Kt−1, (27)
where Kt = KUt +KSt .
The parameters ωS0 , ωS1 relate to exogenous evolution of site-generated contentKSt , which
we set as one of primitives of the model. The amount of SGC, or KSt , is determined by
some unobserved exogenous shock νSt . Viewed in this light, equation 26 approximates the
site’s content generation policy (note that in the empirical data, these site generated posts
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are negligible; hence this approximate policy function is used only in the counterfactual
analysis).
The parameters ωU0t, ωU1 11 for the stock of the aggregate user generated content are de-
termined by the rational expectations equilibrium. We posit the order of the lag in the
state transitions to be consistent with the primitives in the consumer model to help ensure
that the approximate beliefs regarding the aggregate state transitions are consistent with
the Markovian structure in the underlying individual posting model.12
Our model also assumes individual users approximate the average amount of reading per
posting as a function of Kt with
yt = ωy0t + ωy1Kt. (28)
Equation (28) approximates equation (10) which does not have a closed form for the func-
tion yt of Kt. The parameters ωy0t, ωy1 are also determined by the rational expectations
equilibrium.
We use the approximate aggregation approach similar to Krusell and Smith (1998) and
Lee and Wolpin (2006) in lieu of other rational expectations approaches in marketing (e.g.,
Dubé et al. (2010)) because of user heterogeneity in posting stock. ThoughKt is deterministic
given the actions of all individuals and the solution of the implicit function
Kt = KSt + ρ
(
Kt−1 −KSt−1
)
+
M∑
i=1
ai (kit, Kt, τit, εit) , (29)
using equation 29 directly to compute users’ rational expectations requires us to assume
all users know all other users’ policy functions ai (kit, Kt, τit, εit) as well as the distribution
of their individual-level posting stock kit. Complete knowledge of the behavior of many
11ωU0t is indexed by time t to incorporate the fixed effect for weekend in our empirical model. The same
applies to ωy0t below.
12Note that the order of the state transition equations can not be higher than the order of the individual
level model, else the individual level model would fail to account for consumer’s beliefs about these higher
order states. Here we assume individuals only use one lagged Kt to predict Kt+1 and hence it implies an
AR(1) model for Kt. Individuals may use more than one lagged Kt to predict Kt+1. For example, should
users consider an AR(q) model Kt+1 = ωU0,t+1 + ωU1 Kt + · · · + ωUq Kt−q+1, then Kt−1, . . . ,Kt−q+1 will also
be in the set of state variables in individual i’s dynamic optimization problem. As more state variables can
eventually cause the curse of dimensionality, the most parsimonious state transition model forKt is desirable.
Indeed, as a robustness check for our data analysis in Section 7.2, we find the second lag coefficient ωU2 to be
nonsignificant (p-value = 0.73). Durbin-Watson test for the residuals of the AR(1) model Kt = ωU0t+ωU1 Kt−1
has the p-value equal to 0.63, which cannot reject the null hypothesis that the autocorrelation of the residuals
is 0.
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thousands of others is an unrealistic assumption which imposes a large informational burden
on every individual user. In addition, this assumption places the distribution of kit in every
user’s set of state variables. Because the distribution of kit is high-dimensional, the “curse
of dimensionality” renders the dynamic programming problem intractable. As a result,
the approximate aggregation (Krusell and Smith, 1998 and Lee and Wolpin, 2006) only
requires that Kt and yt computed from equations (27) and (28) respectively in the individual
optimization problem coincide with Kt and yt computed from the exact aggregation. Krusell
and Smith (1998) show that using the state transition rule such as in (27) can still generate
a stationary distribution of states like kit instead of a degenerate kt for every agent (which
we further confirm by simulation in Section 4.2.1).
The approximate aggregation approach requires that we ensure that the aggregate state
transitions are consistent with the individual behaviors that underpin it. Using an initial
guess for the parameters ωU0t, ωU1 and ω
y
0t, ω
y
1 , we compute individual behaviors nit, ait
and r∗it. Aggregating across persons, we recompute Kt and yt and recompute individual
behaviors, iterating back and forth between the individual-level and aggregate models until
convergence. Appendix C details the algorithm used to compute a rational expectations
equilibrium. The parameters ωU0t, ωU1 and ω
y
0t, ω
y
1 are re-estimated in every step of the
iterations to find the fixed point of the rational expectations equilibrium.13 This process
ensures that the users’ beliefs about the aggregate state transitions are consistent with the
underpinning individual behaviors. In sum, the use of approximate aggregation enables us
to accommodate heterogeneity in a rational expectations equilibrium model.
4 Theoretical Implications
In this section, we explore some of the theoretical properties of our model. Specifically, we
assess i) convergence to the defined rational expectations equilibrium in Section 3.7 and ii)
how the model’s parameters and exogenous states influence the network’s user content and
readings in equilibrium. This analysis studies the role of initial content on network size, how
site postings affect site traffic, and the effect of content stock decay on content generation.
13In estimation, the aggregate states are observed (reflecting the current equilibrium), so no iteration to
to re-estimate ωU0 , ωU1 and ω
y
0 , ω
y
1 is necessary.
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4.1 Simulation Initialization
We consider two segments in our 100 period simulation, each of whom have the same cost of
reading buy vary in their posting costs and size (one segment is smaller and has lower posting
costs, consistent with the notion that a small number of users predominate the number of
posts. In Appendix D we detail the specific parameters of our simulation.
4.2 Simulation Results
4.2.1 Initial Individual Stock
We select two different sets of values for the initial endowment of individual posting stocks.
The first set of values has the posting stock equal to 3 for any individual in Segment 1 and
0.1 for Segment 2; the second has 8 for Segment 1 and 0.1 for Segment 2. Neither of these
2 sets of initial values are considered extremely high or low, so we expect they converge to
the same equilibrium.
In Figure 2, we plot the equilibrium path of the aggregate user generated postings (UGC)
after the rational expectations equilibrium is achieved. We can see that the first set of
initial values (solid curve) and the second (dashed curve) converge to the same steady-state
aggregate UGC with small random variations. We also find the same equilibrium parameter
values in the equations (27) and (28). The UGC reaches the steady state after only about
10 periods.
Based on the theoretical model in Section 3.3, we expect that that not only the aggregate
UGC converges (shown in Figure 2), but the distribution of individual posting stocks would
be constant in the steady state as well. Figure 3 shows the distribution (histogram) of
individual posting stocks of the two segments of site users in period 50 and 100, when the
UGC has already reached the steady state. These histogram plots confirm our conjecture
that these distributions are indeed invariant over time.
4.2.2 Degenerate Equilibrium
One potential equilibrium of our model is that all individual postings, amount of reading
and site visiting are zero. That is, the network will never expand unless some shock or
intervention enables the network to tip from a non-zero state. For example, extremely low
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Figure 2: Convergence of aggregate user-generated posting stock (UGC) to the steady state
from 2 different starting values.
user-generated posting stock can cause the low reading and site visiting rate, which can
in turn cause lower posting activity and even lower posting stock. In order to test this
conjecture, we select a set of very low initial values for posting stocks: 0.1 for both Segments
1 and 2. The dashed curve in Figure 4 demonstrates the result of this simulation which
converges to the trivial equilibrium, which implies low user activity can eventually cause the
forum to collapse.
4.2.3 Site-generated Content
To move the network off of this zero equilibrium outcome, the site may implement a policy
of generating a sufficiently large number of postings to attract more readers, which will
eventually attract more writers. That is, the site may use site-generated content (SGC)
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Figure 3: Distributions of individual user’s posting stocks of the two segments defined in
Section 4 in steady state.
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Figure 4: Convergence of the aggregate user-generated posting stock (UGC) to two different
steady states from a common starting value when either i) the initial posting stock is random
(solid curve) and 0.1 (dashed curve) as in Section 4.2.2or ii) the site-generated content (KSt )
has the means equal to 20, 000 (solid curve) and 2, 000 (dashed curve) as in Section 4.2.3.
to “jump-start” and “bootstrap” user activity. As a simulation experiment, we choose a
significantly higher level of SGC (with ωS0 = 10000, ωS1 = 0.5, σS = 100 and KSt=1 = 20000)
and test the model with the same low level of initial UGC (posting stock equal to 0.1 for all
users in the two segments). We found the UGC converges to a different equilibrium (solid
curve in Figure 4) which shows a much higher level of user activity.
4.2.4 Decay Parameter and Average Number of Postings per Person
The decay parameter ρ of forum postings implies two opposite effects on user posting activity.
First, lower decay rate (higher ρ) means a post is more likely to be seen in the future, so a
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Figure 5: Average number of postings by individual users in steady state vs. the decay
parameter ρ (solid curve) and the average reading per posting yt vs. the decay parameter ρ
(dashed curve).
user has the incentive to post more. This also raises content available for readers thereby
increasing site participation. However, higher ρ makes posting more “durable” and hence
increases the aggregate posting stock and decreases the rate of reading per posting (via
competition for readers), which could cause a user to post less. The net effect of ρ is not
clear directly from the utility function because a closed-form derivative of the utility with
respect to the decay parameter cannot be easily derived. Therefore, we discretize the space
of the decay parameter (ρ ∈ [0, 1]) to ten equally spaced grid points (0.1, 0.2, ..., 0.9) and
simulate the content and reading given these values.
In Figure 5, we depict the relationship between the decay parameter and the average
number of postings per period per user in Segment 1 (solid curve) based on the simulation
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results. We also plot the relationship between the decay parameter and the average reading
per posting yt (dashed curve). From Figure 5, higher decay parameter will ceteris paribus
cause lower average reading per posting thanks to the competitive effect of more durable
stock postings. However, the average number of postings per user increases when the decay
parameters ρ increases from 0.1 to 0.4 and decreases when ρ is above 0.5. This is due to the
two opposite effects of ρ on user activity; attracting more readers to the site and increasing
the overall reading of a given post over time.
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Figure 6: The relationship between average reading per posting and aggregate user-generated
posting stock in equilibrium.
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4.2.5 Indirect Network Effect of Aggregate UGC
The indirect network effect of the aggregate UGC on individual user’s posting action is
affected by the likelihood their post is read; that is, the numerator (aggregate reading)
and denominator (aggregate postings) in equation (10). The numerator implies a greater
likelihood of reading because more content, KUt , enhances the consumption experience. The
denominator implies a competitive effect of KUt as content increasingly competes for users.
In Figure 6, we show two examples, one where yt is decreasing in KUt and another where
it is decreasing. The decay rate ρ is 0.6 for the first example and 0.1 for the second: all the
remaining parameter values are identical in the two examples. We also find the relationship
between yt and KUt can switch sign if we adjust the ratio of population sizes of the two
segments. Because the numerator is not a closed-form function of KUt , the conditions under
which the network effect of KUt is positive are still unclear. We conjecture that positive
indirect effect is more likely when there is a strong primary effect on site participation and
that the negative indirect effect is more likely when the participation is already high.
5 Data
5.1 Data Overview
Our data come from a large Internet property devoted to a common interest like sporting
events. The site includes a forum where persons can discuss various topics much like fans
would discuss a sports team, its players or various games. We collect two months of forum
participation data from October through November 2009, and use this as our basis of ex-
ploration for social engagement. The customer log files include the complete visit history
for each registrant. The unit of observation is registrant-visit and indicate whether one
reads or posts. We aggregate our data to a daily frequency and conduct our analysis at this
periodicity, considering total reads and posts by each user on a daily basis inclusive of zeros.
Figure 7 plots the joint distribution of reading content generation and consumption,
conditioned on non-zero reading (i.e., a site visit). The figure indicates that reading is
more common than posting and days with higher posting rates tend to have higher reading
rates. The large mode at zero is suggestive of the need to separately model the participation
27
Figure 7: Joint Distribution of Reading and Posting
decision. The figure also indicates there is a fair amount of variation in the reading and
posting behavior across observations.
5.2 Exploratory Analysis
To assess the potential for the presence of indirect effects and dynamics, we conduct a
regression analysis. First, we consider reading. Recall, our model posited a positive link
between aggregate content stock and individual reading. Hence, we regress the daily reads
of individuals against content, using a Koyck formulation to capture posting stock effects
(Clarke (1976)). Though we also include weekend (Thursday, Friday and Saturday) effects,
we omit them from the following table to conserve space:
The contemporaneous effect of aggregate posts is significant as is the infinite horizon
effect, which is given by 0.000033/(1-0.655). The exploratory regression suggests two things
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Variable Parameter Estimate t-value p-value
Aggregate Posting 0.000054 4.09 0.0001
Lag Reading 0.647 804.0 0.0001
n 898,139
R2 0.42
Table 1: The Effect of Aggregate Posting Stock on Individual Reading
– first, posts have a stock effect consistent with Section 3.2.2 because the lag reading term
is significant and second, that there is a positive indirect effect of posting stock on reading.
Variable Parameter Estimate t-value p-value
Aggregate Reading Rates 165.36 29.07 0.0001
Aggregate Posting 0.0000106 3.67 0.0001
Lag Aggregate Posts 0.0000019 0.66 0.510
n 898,139
R2 0.0013
Table 2: The Effect of Aggregate Reading Rates on Individual Posting
Next, we explore the indirect effect of reading rates and competitive effects of aggregate
posting rates on the number of postings as discussed in Section 4.2.5. Table 2 reports the
results of this regression. Consistent with our assumptions, the results suggest a strong effect
of reading on the likelihood of posting. We also find a positive effect of aggregate posting on
postings, suggesting that site participation effects dominate competitive effects (see 4.2.5).
Overall, the exploratory analysis is consistent with the presence of indirect network effects
and a stock effect for posts.
6 Estimation and Identification
6.1 Estimation
An efficient single-step estimation approach using maximum likelihood requires solving the
dynamic optimization problem for every individual user and the rational expectations equi-
librium for the aggregate reading and posting for each iteration of a nonlinear optimization
program. The computational cost of this approach is considerable. To alleviate this problem,
we design a two-step approach, which is a more computationally feasible estimation strategy.
In this approach we first estimate the state transition equation for the aggregate UGC in
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(27) and the reading-per-posting as a function of the UGC in (28) and then, in the second
step, estimate the structural parameters in the individual reading, posting and site-visiting
models.
In the second step, we impute these equations into the dynamic optimization model of
posting. There are three estimation problems in the second stage: the reading, posting
and site-visitation models. The reading model in equation (8) is estimated via maximum
likelihood as detailed in Appendix E.1. The posting model estimation parallels Dubé et al.
(2009), which is an MLE algorithm using mathematical programming with equilibrium con-
straints (MPEC). See Appendix E.2 for details. The site-visitation model in equation (25)
is estimated as a binary choice model given the estimates of the parameters in the reading
and posting models; this estimation is detailed in Appendix E.3.
6.2 Identification
Corresponding to the two-step estimation in Section 6.1, there are two sets of parameters
to identify in the model: (i) the parameters in the aggregate models (27) and (28) and (ii)
the structural parameters in the individual utility and cost functions of reading, posting and
site-visitation.
We first consider the system of equations in the first stage estimation model of aggregate
state levels. Site-generated content KSt is set to be zero because the website does not
generate a substantial number of postings (only dozens of postings a day at most and zero
in some days) in our data. Because the UGC and its corresponding stock KUt is generated
endogenously with the rate of reading per posting yt, the identification of these aggregate
state transition models follows from the exclusion restrictions due to the lag posting stock
Kt−1 in equation (27), which is similar to using lagged prices in Nair (2007). First, we note
that the lag stock is correlated with current stock. This claim follows from the definition of
the individual stock variables which are comprised of decayed individual posting stock kit
and any current period additions to content ait; this decay process leads to a strong auto-
correlation for the aggregate Kt that increases with the stock decay parameter, ρ. Indeed,
the auto-correlation parameter ωU1 in equation (27), which is a reduced-form AR(1) model
for the aggregate Kt, is estimated to be 0.93 by the data. Next, we argue that the lag stock is
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not correlated with current period reading rates yit. Based on the individual reading model
in Section 3.2, the average amount of reading per posting yt is the aggregate rit’s divided by
Kt and the rit is aslo a function of the current stock Kt. Hence, yit should be conditionally
independent of KUt−1 given KUt , which is reflected by equation (28).
In the second stage, the parameters in the individual reading model are identified by the
data. In equation (9), the mean level of reading is equal to (α1 − κ1it − ζi)/ (α2/Kt + κ2i),
which implies identical value if we multiply both the numerator and the denominator by
a common factor. For identification, we therefore fix α2 to be one. The effects ζ¯j for the
heterogeneous cost in the J segments are identified by the cross section of mean reading rates
across users and the fixed effects for the week-days are identified by the variation of reading
in individual time series. Given the estimated state transition for the aggregate variable Kt,
the individual-level posting model is a single-agent dynamic discrete choice model which is
nonlinear in the utility and cost parameters. These parameters are identified by the panel
structure of the posting data. Note that the aggregate states are considered to be exogenous
in the individual level reading and content generation models because, as the size of the
reading and posting populations become large, the expectation of the sum of the individual
level shocks tends to zero and becomes independent of the individual-specific shocks. Lastly,
the site-visitation model is a simple nested logit model where the scale parameters µ0 and
µ1 are identified by the panel structure of the site-visitation data.
7 Results
7.1 Initialization of Posting Stock
As indicated in Section 3.2.2, the posting stock is incumbent upon the decay rate of a post.
We estimate the exogenous posting decay parameter ρ using auxiliary data collected by the
Internet site regarding when a sample set of the site’s posts were visited by its users. The
decay in the number of users clicking on these posts over time is informative about their
durability. From these data, we consider a random sample of 474 postings posted on the
forums in the first week of sampling period.
The decay parameter is identified by the ratio of the times that a posting is read in
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periods t and t+1. Note that this ratio is independent of the endogenous average amount of
reading per posting yt. Under the exponential decay assumption, this ratio equals the decay
rate in the amount of reading per posting (the ratio of reading per posting in period t divided
by reading per posting in t + 1). By stacking all observations of this ratio across users and
periods, generalized least squares and can therefore be used to infer the post decay. We use
feasible GLS to control for high variation in this ratio for observations in excess of 10 days
after a post (because there are few reads after 10 days, this ratio becomes less reliable). In
addition, we control for potential seasonal effect due to the day of the week. The resulting
estimate for the mean decay is 0.737, which implies that 90% of the post’s stock is depleted
after one week.
Note that we do not observe individuals’ initial posting stocks in the first week of the
data as there is no history of posts prior to the initial week. Hence, using this posting
stock decay estimate, the individual posting stock is computed by setting the initial stock
at zero and recursively applying equation (2) using the 61-day posting data repeatedly until
the individual’s posting stock reaches a steady state. The individual’s steady state is then
re-used as the initial posting stock to calculate the individual posting stock for the 61-day
data. We adopt this practice because the users in our sample have been using the forum for
long time prior to the sampling period, hence their posting stocks are likely to have reach
the steady state (with daily random variation) at the inception of our data. We similarly
compute the aggregate stock KUt for the same sample stock. The site-generated content KSt
is set to zero because there are too few KSt relative to the KUt (about 0.02%).
7.2 Approximate Aggregation Results
Section 3.7 outlines the aggregate state transition model that captures the rational expec-
tations process. The estimation results for the AR(1) model in (27) and (28) are reported
in Table (3). The results provide evidence of strong auto-correlation (ωU1 = 0.93) for the
aggregate stock. The rate of reading per posting is an increasing function of aggregate stock
(ωy1 = 5.43 × 10−6 is statistically significant), which implies the positive indirect network
effect of posting on site participation exceeds the negative competitive effect for our forum
data. The week-day effects for Monday and Tuesday in model (27) are not significantly dif-
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Model AR(1) for UGC stock Reading-per-posting
Intercept ωU0 or ω
y
0 [1945, 55909] 6.02 [4.14, 7.90]
Lag UGC stock ωU1 0.93 [0.86, 0.99] –
Current UGC stock ωy1 – 5.43× 10−6 [0.36, 10.5]× 10−6
Weekend effect ωU0t or ω
y
0t −6922 [−8802,−5043] −0.55 [−0.69,−0.42]
Residual R2 0.89 0.51
Table 3: Estimation Results for Aggregate Posting Stock Transition Equation and Rate of
Reading-per-Posting Equation (with 95% confidence intervals in brackets)
ferent from Sunday, whereas the effects for Wednesday, Thursday, Friday and Saturday are
significantly negative, which implies lower posting activity for these days of a week. All the
week-day effects in model (28) are significantly negative, which means lower reading activity
for these days.
7.3 Individual-level Model Results (Posting, Reading and Site
Visitation)
We randomly select a sample of 600 users users to estimate the individual-level model. The
amount of reading and number of postings for each individual in the sample are recorded for
61 days from October 1st to November 30th, 2009. If both reading and posting are zero for
a user in a certain day, we conclude the user does not visit the site that day.
7.3.1 Estimates of Utility and Cost Parameters in Posting and Reading
Table 4 reports parameter estimates for the posting and reading models assuming two seg-
ments of users. for a discount parameter of β = 0.98.14 The two segments are specified to
share a common posting utility parameter, γ, in equation (12) but differ with respect to their
posting costs, ξ¯j , in equation (13) as heterogeneity in costs and utilities are not separately
identified. Likewise, the two segments in the reading model share a common utility param-
eter, α1, but differ with respect to linear marginal cost parameter, ζ¯j, because heterogeneity
in costs and utilities are also not separately identified.
Comparing the two groups, the second segment is slightly smaller in size and evidences
higher reading and posting costs; hence, this group of users read less often and rarely posts
14We also test three segment of users. However, the BIC for the three-segment model is higher than the
two-segment model.
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Parameters First Segment Second Segment
Frequent Users Light Users
Posting Model
Utility coefficient γ 0.85*[0.79, 0.88]
Cost coefficient ξ¯j 1.17* [0.74, 1.32] 7.64* [3.00, 8.90]
Weekend effect τ¯jt 0.026* [0.01, 0.57] 0.73* [0.09, 1.30]
Reading Model
Utility coefficient α1 11.51* [3.66, 17.56]
Linear cost coefficient ζ¯j −7.88* [−1.59,−12.64] 7.88* [1.59, 12.64]
Weekend cost effect κ1t −0.16[−1.23, 0.88] 0.041[−0.24, 0.32]
Quadratic cost coefficient κ¯2j 0.36 [0.07, 0.76] 0.16 [0.04, 0.21]
Site Visitation Model
Intercept, µ0j 1.15 [0.24, 4.91] 0.70[0.23, 1.11]
Reading scale parameter µ1 0.10 [0.032, 0.16]
Gumbel scale parameter η 0.46 [0.12, 0.80]
Heterogeneity
Segment size 59.7% [41.4%, 65.5%] 40.3% [34.5%, 58.6%]
Table 4: Estimation Results for Utility and Cost Parameters in Posting and Reading
content. Hence, we denote them “light users.” Also of note, the weekend effect τ¯jt in the
posting cost function is positive, so the users tend to post less on a weekend.
7.3.2 Site-Visitation Estimates
As indicated in Table 4, the intercept for the frequent users is higher than light users; all else
equal the frequent users visit more. However, the difference is not statistically significant,
suggesting the observed difference in visitation rates across segments is primarily due to
expected reading and writing utility upon visitation, and that the time invariant unobserved
factors add little to distinguish the visitation behavior across segments. We estimate a
common set of scale parameters because it is not clear why these scale factors should differ
across segments (of note, we find no significant difference when we estimate them separately).
7.4 Policy Simulations and Comparative Statics
In this section, we consider the policy ramifications of our model. One concern involves how
the site should manage its own content development strategy to enhance traffic. Second,
we consider the choice of whether to invest in new contributors or new readers. Our model,
by measuring network effects, affords insights into which of the two strategies generates a
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higher marginal effect on overall site usage. A third policy experiments concerns increasing
the durability of posts and, in a fourth, we consider the potential for self-fulfilling prophecies
to assess whether erroneous beliefs can yield different participation outcomes in the steady
state.
7.4.1 Site Generated Content Strategies
As indicated in Figure 6, the ex ante effect of additional content on posting is ambiguous.
On one hand, there is a competitive effect that lowers reading likelihood of the other posts.
On the other hand, increased content can generate more readership, thereby increasing the
utility of posting and the resultant posts. We consider this trade off explicitly and intend
to make recommendations regarding the site’s participation levels. It is worth noting that
these levels are currently negligible15 and that the site management is particularly interested
in the outcome of this analysis.
Given that the current net network effect of UGC estimated from the data is positive,
we postulate that smaller amount of SGC will attract more readers to the forum, which will
lead to higher utility for posting and consequently greater amount of UGC. However, higher
SGC will make the competitive effect dominant and cause the endogenous net network effect
negative eventually, which will reduce UGC.
We simulate user-generated content (UGC) in the rational expectations equilibrium by
manipulating the site-generated content in the current equilibrium; that is we consider incre-
mental site content over the long run average level of user content. Because the site usually
hires users of the forum to write postings, we further assume forum readers view and respond
to the site-generated content in the same way as to the user-generated content. The resulting
percentage change in average user-generated postings and number of visitors in equilibrium
over a 70-day simulated sequence versus the levels of SGC is plotted in Figure 8.
Figure 8 demonstrates that SGC initially increases both the number of visitors and the
user-generated content. As the site content increases further to about 7%, it begins to reduce
the amount of UGC as the competitive effect of postings begin to predominate.16 At that
15In the current data, site posts are less then .2% of total daily posts.
16The seemingly oscillating behavior of the curves is due to sampling errors, as the mean number of
postings is only the average of a 70-day simulated sequence.
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Figure 8: Effect of site generated content strategies on user-generated content and number
of site visitor
point, the increment in UGC due to the site-generated content is only about 0.4%. As the
site content increases further to 12%, it begins to reduce the number of visitors in response to
the continued decrease in the number of user posts . At this point, the incremental number
of visitors at this point reaches its maximum of 2.2%. Whether the strategy is profitable
depends on the relative costs of generating the content and the advertising revenue generated
by having 2.2% more users.
7.4.2 Lowering User Generation and Reading Costs
Pursuant to the consideration of whether to invest in increasing reading and posting, we
consider the marginal effect of reading and posting costs. These costs can be lowered by
changes in site design, emails to users or possibly incentives. Specifically, we intend to
compute the effect of a 10% decrease in reading and posting costs on overall site traffic
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(number of visitors per day) and the number of postings. Such a simulation will generate
insights into where the greatest efficiency in investment might be. We find reducing the cost
of posting for both segments of forum users will increase the aggregate number of postings by
18.9% and the number of visitors by 3.8%. Reducing the cost of reading by 10% will increase
the aggregate number of postings by 7.9% and the number of visitors by 11.3%. Hence,
we conclude that strategies reducing reading cost, such as making the forum more easily
accessible to readers such as providing forum access applications for smart phone users, are
the most efficient ways to promote site traffic as long as the expense of reducing reading
costs is sufficiently similar to that of reducing posting costs.
If we ignore the rational expectations equilibrium for these policy simulations, the ag-
gregate state transition for UGC will be spurious when the costs of posting or reading are
reduced by 10%. When the cost of posting is reduced by 10% and the rational expectations
equilibrium is ignored, the simulation predicts 21.1% gain in the aggregate number of post-
ings and 4.1% increase in the number of site visitors. This is because ignoring the rational
expectations equilibrium underestimates both the competing effect of postings and the rate
of reading per posting. Hence, the model over-estimates UGC by 11% and the number of
visitors by 7%. When the cost of reading is reduced by 10% and the rational expectations
equilibrium is ignored, the model predicts 4.4% gain in the the number of postings and
8.4% increase in the number of site visitors. Ignoring the rational expectations equilibrium
underestimates the increase in postings by 44% when there are more visitors, which in turn
underestimates the increase in the number of visitors by 26%.
7.4.3 Extending Post Durability
In Footnote Section 8, we demonstrated that increasing the durability of postings gives users
incentive to post more. However, increasing durability can also decrease postings owing to
the increasing competitive effect of past postings. To test whether the forum can promote
posting activity and increase the number of visitors by extending the durability of postings,
we raise the decay parameter ρ from the estimated 0.737 to 0.85, which approximately
doubles the expected life-time of any given postings (the 90% decay interval increase from
one to two weeks). Results indicate that raising ρ to 0.85 will increase user generated postings
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by 22.8% and the number of visitors by 9.1%. Because extending the durability of postings
can be achieved by employing a better search engine and/or improving the website layout,
which often incurs only a one-time sunk cost, it may be a very fruitful strategy to enhance
participation at the site.
7.4.4 Self-fulfilling Prophecies
Owing to the formation of beliefs regarding aggregate state transitions as indicated in equa-
tions 26 - 28, content generation and reading decisions are incumbent upon future beliefs.
Of interest is the possibility that these beliefs become self-reinforcing. This issue can be
explored by shocking these beliefs in the short-term (by varying the initial states and the
variances in the state transition equations) and the long-term (by varying the regression
coefficients in the state transition equations) seeing how the evolution of content generation
and consumption change relative to a situation where the beliefs are initially inconsistent
with the long-term behaviors.
In order to test whether shocking short-term beliefs can lead to different long-term behav-
iors, i.e., converging to different equilibria of the model, we reset the initial belief about the
aggregate user-generated posting stock to 5%, 25%, 50%, 150%, and 200% of the observed
actual stock and simulate the rational expectation equilibrium following the algorithm in
Section 3.7. We find all these simulations converge to the same equilibrium which has the
same levels of mean UGC and number of visitors as in the observed data. We also reset
the initial belief about the variance in the state transition equation for the aggregate UGC
to 25%, 50%, 150%, 200% and 300% of the value estimated from the real data. All these
simulations again converge to the original equilibrium. Hence, we conclude that shocking
short term beliefs will not lead to self-fulfilling behavior.
To evaluate whether erroneous long-term beliefs about the transition rule of aggregate
UGC can lead to different equilibrium, we set the initial value for the auto-regressive coeffi-
cient ωU1 in equation (27) to 0.1, 0.2,...,0.9 and simulate their corresponding equilibria. We
find they always converge to the same equilibrium in which the auto-regressive coefficient
ωU1 is 0.84. Therefore, erroneous long-term beliefs about the transition rule will not lead
to self-fulfilling behavior. Note that the rational expectations equilibrium in our model is
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similar to that by Krusell and Smith (1998), who also found the absence of self-fulfilling
behavior in their model.
8 Conclusions
Recent advances in technology and media have enabled user generated content sites to be-
come an increasingly prevalent source of information for consumers as well as an increasingly
relevant channel for advertisers to reach users of these sites. Hence, the factors driving the
use of these networks is of a topical concern to marketers. In this paper, therefore, we con-
sider how content, readership and site policy drive the evolution of content and readership
on these sites.
Given our goal is to develop prescriptive and theoretical insights regarding user engage-
ment on user generated content platforms, we build upon the existing literature on social
participation by developing a dynamic structural model to explore these effects. Individual
reading behavior is developed from a model of information search that relates reading to the
overall level of content on the site. Individual content generation is assumed to reflect the
utility that participants receive from the number of others reading the posts. Underpinning
these two behaviors are users’ beliefs regarding how the aggregate amount of content and
readership on the platform evolve. These beliefs stem from the rational expectations equi-
librium model whereby the evolution of aggregate reading and content states are assumed
to be consistent with the aggregation of individual level reading and contribution decisions
across the population.
Our paper makes several contributions. On a methodological front, we develop a dynamic
structural model of user generated content. To our knowledge, it is also the first paper in
marketing to apply the approximate aggregation approach of Krusell and Smith (1998), which
facilitates the computation of rational expectations equilibrium in the face of a large number
of heterogeneous agents. This approach could prove useful in other contexts wherein firms
face heterogeneous consumers. For example, heterogeneous learning about new consumer
products can affect how prices evolve, and consumer may anticipate and react to such changes
Narayanan and Manchanda (2009). Initial estimates of our model of UGC demonstrate that
the indirect network effect or aggregate reading on posting and aggregate posting on reading
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are both significant.
On a theoretical dimension, we explore the tipping effects and self fulfilling prophecies
in the context of two sided network wherein one side involved content creation and one
involved content consumption. We find that the potential exists for multiple equilibria
depending upon whether initial usage can cross a sufficient threshold to attract participation;
users will not visit the site to read if there is no material and users will not post if there
are no readers. Of future interest, this approach can be applied to assess the formation
or dissolution of similar networks, such as academic journals (readers and authors), social
media sites, blogs and so forth. Another theoretical insight is that user and site content can
serve as strategic complements or substitutes depending on whether the primary demand
effect of content (attracting more users) dominates the secondary demand effect (splitting
readers). An analogous argument can be constructed for past and current posts as their
durability increases.
On a substantive domain, we consider a number of policy prescriptions to advise the
sponsoring site. First, we consider the role of their own content on user participation. On
the one hand, site posts attract more readers, thereby growing the network. On the other
hand, these posts are competitive with other users’ posts for reader attention. Overall, we
conclude that the former effect predominates and the site can increase visitation by 2.2% by
increasing content by 12%. Beyond this point, the sites posts crowd user posts leading to
a decrease in posts and visitors. In addition, we explore the relative effect of reducing user
cost of participation and contrast the relative effect of reading and content generation costs,
finding that lower posting costs has a more substantial effect than lowering reading costs.
To the extent that cost mitigation strategies are equivalently expensive to implement, the
posting cost reduction should be the first considered. Further, we find that the durability of
posts has an effect analogous to site generated contents inasmuch as old posts can serve as
strategic substitutes or complements (they also lower the effective costs per post). Overall,
we find that increasing the durability of posts is one of the more effective strategies for
enhancing site participation and engagement.
Several opportunities for extensions present. First, the site we consider is the largest
forum by market share on the topic it covers much like Youtube is for videos. In practice, the
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potential for competition exists in other context and extending our work to a duopoly context
would be of interest Zhang and Sarvary (2011). Second, content is not homogeneous and
it would useful to extend our model to capture heterogeneity in content in order to explore
which information is most relevant in increasing site engagement. Related, the potential
exists that certain lead content creators generate large followings (such as on Twitter) and
measuring the effect of lead users is of practical interest. While sites generally consider such
participation to be positive, it is also possible for the content to compete with others and
actually reduce site participation. In sum, we hope that our research will lead to additional
innovations in both user generated content and the application of the rational expectations
equilibrium theory in marketing.
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Appendix
A The Utility of Reading
Assume the quality of a given content item has a uniform distribution on a closed interval
[L,U ], where U > L ≥ 0 and U −L is the length of the support of the uniform distribution.
Note the mean is (U + L) /2 and the variance is (U − L)2 /12. The qualities of the K˜t
postings noticed by individual i, denoted as Q1, . . . , QK˜t , are iid from Unif [L,U ].
We assume the individual reads the postings according to their quality ranking, then
the marginal utility gains measured by incremental quality from an additional posting is an
increasing function of the total stock postings K˜t. Let the qualities of K˜t postings be ranked
as their order statistics Q[1] ≤ Q[2] ≤ · · · ≤ Q[K˜t]. Q[k] has the following distribution:
Q[k] ∼ K˜t!
(k − 1)!
(
K˜t − k
)
!
(
q − L
U − L
)k−1 (U − q
U − L
)K˜t−k 1
U − L (A1)
Note this is linear transformation from a Beta distribution. That is
(
Q[k] − L
)
/ (U − L) has
a Beta(k, K˜t + 1− k) distribution. Therefore we have
E
(
Q[k]|K˜t
)
= (U − L) k
K˜t + 1
+ L. (A2)
If individual i select to reads ri highest quality postings, the expected utility given K˜t is
u (ri) = E
 K˜t∑
k=K˜t−ri+1
Q[k]|K˜t
 = K˜t∑
k=K˜t−ri+1
{
(U − L) k
K˜t + 1
+ L
}
= (U − L)
{
K˜t + 1/2
K˜t + 1
ri − 1
K˜t + 1
r2i
2
}
+ Lri. (A3)
We can approximate the realized stock K˜t with its expected value Kt thanks to the law of
large numbers and K˜t being very large (over 100,000 in our data) . We have
u (ri) = (U − L)
{
Kt + 1/2
Kt + 1
ri − 1
Kt + 1
r2i
2
}
+ Lri. (A4)
and the marginal utility of reading
d
dri
u (ri) = (U − L) Kt + 1/2
Kt + 1
+ L− U − L
Kt + 1
ri, (A5)
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is an increasing function of Kt. We can reparametrize α1 = U and α2 = U − L and define
u (ri) =
α1Kt + (α1 − α2) + 12α2
Kt + 1
ri − α2
Kt + 1
r2i
2 . (A6)
Note the utility of reading can be further simplified when Kt is a large number using the
approximation Kt + 1 ≈ Kt and [Kt + (α1 − α2) /α1 + α2/2α1] / (Kt + 1) ≈ 1. In that case,
we have
u (ri) ≈ α1rit − α2r
2
it
2Kt
. (A7)
B Aggregate Reading
Here we show the expected amount of reading per posting yt define in equation (10) can be
closely approximated by the observed amount of reading per posting. By summing equation
9, the expected amount of reading of a given user, we obtain the aggregate expected amount
of reading by all users,
Rt = E
(
M∑
i=1
nitr
∗
it
)
=
M∑
i=1
E (nitr∗it) , (A8)
where M is the total number of users.17 When we apply the latent segment model, the
expected amount of reading of any user i is
E (nitr∗it) = E [E (nitr∗it|nit, ζi)]
= E [nitE (r∗it|nit, ζi)]
=
ˆ
sit
J∑
j=1
pjp (nit = 1|sit)E
(
r∗it|ζ¯j, nit = 1
)
dF (sit) , (A9)
where F (sit) is the stationary distribution of the state variables sit and p(nit = 1|sit) is the
probability that the user i visits the site at period t defined in Section 3.5. By substituting
A9 into A8, we have
Rt =
M∑
i=1
ˆ
sit
J∑
j=1
pjp (nit = 1|sit)Eν
(
r∗it|ζ¯j, nit = 1
)
dF (sit) (A10)
= M
ˆ
sit
J∑
j=1
pjp (nit = 1|sit) α1 − κ1jt − ζ¯j
α2/Kt + κ2j
dF (sit) , (A11)
17As the number of registered users does not change vary by more than 3% over the duration of our data,
we treat the market size, M , as fixed over time in our model. That said, overall traffic can increase when
the likelihood of visiting a site increases.
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and obviously Rt/M = E (nitr∗it).
The expected readings Rt in Equation (A10) is not equal to the actual total amount of
reading in every period. The observed total amount of reading which is denoted by R˜t is
defined by
R˜t =
∑M
i=1 nitr
∗
it =
M∑
i=1
J∑
j=1
nitI
(
ζi = ζ¯j
) α1 − κ1jt − ζ¯j
α2/Kt + κ2j
νit,
so it is obvious that
E
(
R˜t
)
= E
(
E
(
R˜t|nit, ζi
))
= M
ˆ
sit
J∑
j=1
pjp (nit = 1|sit) α1 − κ1jt − ζ¯j
α2/Kt + κ2j
= Rt.
When the numberM is large, we have R˜t/M is approximately equal to E (nitr∗it) = Rt/M
because of the law of large numbers. The expected average amount of reading per posting
yt =
Rt
Kt
= Rt/M
Kt/M
≈ R˜t/M
Kt/M
= R˜t
Kt
,
which implies we can use the observed average amount of reading per posting to approximate
the expected one in our model when the number of users is very large.
C Rational expectations
The following steps outline our approach to computing rational expectations and the result-
ing aggregate state transitions for the policy simulations and theoretical analysis.
1. Set structural parameters for utilities and costs of site usage, reading, and writing as
well as µS, σS. Put bounds on state spaces of KSt , KUt , {ki,t}Ni=1, and yt. This can be
done by restricting value functions near lower and upper bounds of KSt , KUt , {ki,t}Ni=1,
and yt.
2. Guess the values for ωU0 , ωU1 , ωU2 and ω
y
0 , ω
y
1 , ω
y
2 .
3. Discretize the state space and select points in the state space.
4. Solve for p(nit = 1|sit, ζi), p(rit|sit, nit = 1), and p(ait|sit, nit = 1). The solution to
dynamic choices require the value of yt consistent with both aggregate reading and
writing decisions (Rt and Kt). To get this value, we use the following steps:
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(a) Choose an arbitrary yoldt and K
U,old
t
(b) Solve for decisions by users: {nit, rit, ait}Ni=1. Equivalently, we compute p(nit =
1|sit, ζi), p(rit|sit, nit = 1), and p(ait|sit, nit = 1).
i. Given yoldt , we can solve for p(ait|sit, nit = 1) . If the state space is discrete, we
use Rust (1987) to solve for EV s. If the state space is continuous or discrete
but large, we use with Chebyshev approximation to expected value functions.
ii. Given KU,oldt , we can solve for r∗it.
iii. Given p(ait|sit, nit = 1) and r∗it, we can solve for p(nit = 1|sit, ζi).
(c) Compute ynewt and K
U,new
t . Check if yoldt = ynewt and K
U,old
t = KU,newt . If the
conditions hold then stop. If not, set yoldt = ynewt and K
U,old
t = KU,newt and iterate
steps 4a-4c until convergence.
5. Solve for rational expectations by computing KUt+1|KUt , KSt+1 and yt+1|KUt , KSt+1 and
run OLS to get
KUt+1 = ω˜U0 + ω˜U1 KUt + ω˜U2 KSt+1
yt+1 = ω˜y0 + ω˜y1
(
KUt+1 +KSt+1
)
6. Check if ωU0 , ωU1 , ωU2 and ω
y
0 , ω
y
1 , ω
y
2 are close to ω˜U0 , ω˜U1 , ω˜U2 and ω˜
y
0 , ω˜
y
1 , ω˜
y
2 . If the condi-
tions hold then stop. If not, replace ωs with ω˜s and iterate steps 2-5 until convergence.
Note that in estimation, the aggregate state transitions are observed and assumed to reflect
the rational expectations in the current equilibrium, so no iteration to achieve the rational
expectations is necessary. In policy simulations and theoretical analysis, however, we need
to iterate to obtain them.
D Simulation Design
In section 4, we consider 2 segments of 3000 and 6000 users as their respective population
sizes. We let both segments have the same cost of reading and heterogeneous costs (ξ¯j) of
content generation. To simply the simulation, we assume there is no seasonal effect (τ¯jt = 0
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and κ¯1jt = 0). The reading cost parameters α1 − κ1 = 0.1, α2 = 1 and κ2i = 0.0015 imply a
posting stock of Kt = 10, 000 will induce an individual user to read 62.5 different postings
per period. We let the cost of posting for Segment 1 be ξ¯1 = 0.1 and segment 2 be ξ¯2 = 5.
Note that ξ¯2 is 50 times of ξ¯1, which implies Segment 2 has a much higher cost of posting and
hence users in Segment 2 are likely to post much less than those in Segment 1. Indeed, we
find in equilibrium a user in Segment 2 writes only about 2 postings in 100 periods whereas
a user in Segment 1 writes about 350 posting in the same periods on average. We set the
posting utility parameter γ = 0.5.
We endow every individual user with a randomly selected initial stock of user generated
content. The initial aggregate stock of UGC is the summation of individual stocks plus
a fixed initial stock of site generated content. The discount parameter β in the utility of
posting is set to be 0.98. The site-generated content KSt is assumed to have an exogenous
AR(1) process defined by equation(26) with ωS0 = 1000, ωS1 = 0.5 and σS = 100. Hence,
KSt has a normal stationary distribution with mean equal to 2000 and standard deviation
approximately 115. We use 2000 as the starting value for KSt=1.
We simulate individual postings and amount of reading for 100 periods. We then use
the aggregate number of postings to re-estimate the dynamic law of motion for the posting
stock, which will in turn lead to new values functions for both segments of user. The new
value functions are used to simulate individual posting data again. This process is iterated
until the law of motion for the posting converges. From numerous repeated experiments, we
found it takes fewer than 20 iterations to converge to the rational expectations equilibrium.
For illustration purpose, we show an example where the decay parameter ρ is set to be 0.6
(implying that each day there is a 60% chance that the post is noticed relative to the previous
day).
E Model Estimation
E.1 Estimating the Reading Model
The individual-level reading model is
rit =
α1 − κ1t − ζi
α2/Kt + κ2
νit.
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We assume that there are J segments and if user i is in the j-th segment, we have
rit =
α1 − κ1jt − ζ¯j
α2/Kt + κ2j
νit (A12)
If we assume νit has the exponential distribution, the likelihood function for rit given i in
segment j is
Exponential
(
rit|α1 − κ1jt − ζ¯j
α2/Kt + κ2j
)
If we do not know segment membership of i, the likelihood becomes the following finite
mixture distribution
J∑
j=1
pjExponential
(
rit|α1 − κ1jt − ζ¯j
α2/Kt + κ2j
)
.
E.2 Estimating the Posting Model
One key component of estimation is to approximate the expected value functions in equation
(16). This task is nontrivial for our model, because our state variables are mostly continuous
with a wide support. Moreover, the control variable can take high-order discrete values. For
this reason, we use Chebyshev approximation to approximate the expected value functions
as described in (Dubé et al. (2009); Miranda and Fackler (2002)). Chebyshev approximation
uses polynomial interpolation to approximate the expected value functions:
E˜V j(s, a) ≈ ψΓ(s, a).
We can then rewrite the Bellman equation in the fixed point algorithm as a function of the
interpolated functions
ψΓ(s, a) =
ˆ
s′
log
∑
a′∈A
exp {u(a′|s′)− c(a′|s′) + βψΓ (s′, a′)}
 · p(s′|s, a)ds′.
To compute the right-hand side of the above equation, we need to numerically evaluate an
indefinite integral with respect to state transition probabilities of aggregate stock of posting.
Since we use a normal distribution to model the probabilities, the Gauss-Hermite quadrature
can be used to approximate the integration in the Bellman equation above (Miranda and
Fackler, 2002). The Gauss-Hermite quadrature allows us to evaluate the integrand at fewer
points than, for example, a Monte Carlo integration.
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Once we compute both sides of the fixed point equation, we can formulate constraints to
be used for our estimation based on the MPEC approach (Su and Judd, 2010):
R(s, a;ψ) = ψΓ(s, a)−
ˆ
log
∑
a′∈A
exp {u(a′|s′)− c(a′|s′) + βψΓ (s′, a′)}
 · p(s′|s, a)ds′ = 0.
By approximating the expected value functions, we can transform a dynamic discrete
choice model into a static one and use a maximum likelihood estimation to recover the
structural parameters of our interest.
The joint likelihood of reading and posting for all individuals is then
M∏
i=1
J∑
j=1
pj
T∏
t=1
Exponential
(
rit|α1 − κ1jt − ζ¯j
α2/Kt + κ2j
)
u(ait|sit)∑
a′∈A exp
{
u(a′|sit)− c(a′|sit) + E˜V j(sit, a′)
}
 .
(A13)
The direct MLE approach (e.g., Kamakura and Russell (1989)) is applied to estimate the
parameters. To compute the standard errors of parameter estimates in the posting model,
we use nonparametric bootstrapping. Note that we allow for heterogeneity for reading and
posting costs using finite mixture models, which makes it difficult to implement nonparamet-
ric bootstrapping for computing standard errors due to the label switching problem. Geweke
and Keane (1997) propose labeling restrictions that prevent the components of the mixture
from interchanging across bootstrapped samples. For example, segments can be ordered
according to their sizes to preserve segment labels consistently across bootstrapped samples.
E.3 Estimating the Site Visitation Model
Lastly, we have the likelihood function for site-visitation data following equation (25):
M∏
i=1
J∑
j=1
pj
T∏
t=1
[
P (nit = 1|sit)nitP (nit = 0|sit)1−nit
] , (A14)
which is also estimated by MLE.
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